How to negotiate with persians - an American view from 1979

I took this text is from wikileaks. It briefs the US Secretary of State on how to negotiate with the persians. The text was wrote by the US Embassy in Teheran in 1979. This was the way the american diplomacy used do see the persians after the Ayatolah's Revolution.

O texto que segue é da Wikileaks e mostra uma descrição da Embaixada dos Estados Unidos em Teerã so bre como negociar com os iranianos. As qualificações são várias: egoístas, os iranianos têm dificuldades de interrelacionar eventos, são imediatistas e têm mentalidade de "bazaar". O texto é de 1979, mas mostra uma descrição interessante (e em alguns momentos até mesmo engraçada) e como a diplomacia norte-americana encarava os iranianos logo após a Revolução dos Ayatolas.

Leiam e decidam: preconceito ou descrição real? O original do texto está aqui.

R 130458Z AUG 79

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3182C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 08980

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/12/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P

TAGS: PEPR IR

SUBJECT: NEGOTIATIONS

¶1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

¶2. INTRODUCTION: RECENT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE

EMBASSY HAS BEEN INVOLVED HERE, RANGING FROM COMPOUND

SECURITY TO VISA OPERATIONS TO GTE TO THE SHERRY CASE,

HIGHLIGHT SEVERAL SPECIAL FEATURES OF CONDUCTING

BUSINESS IN THE PERSIAN ENVIRONMENT. IN SOME INSTANCES

THE DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED ARE A PARTIAL

REFLECTION ON THE EFFECTS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION,

BUT WE BELIEVE THE UNDERLYING CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL

QUALITIES THAT ACCOUNT FOR THE NATURE OF THESE DIFFICULTIES

ARE AND WILL REMAIN RELATIVELY CONSTANT. THEREFORE,

WE SUGGEST THAT THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS BE USED TO BRIEF

BOTH USG PERSONNEL AND PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVES

WHO ARE REQUIRED TO DO BUSINESS WITH AND IN THIS

COUNTRY. END INTRODUCTION.

¶3. PERHAPS THE SINGLE DOMINANT ASPECT OF THE PERSIAN

PSYCHE IS AN OVERRIDING EGOISM. ITS ANTECEDENTS LIE

IN THE LONG IRANIAN HISTORY OF INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY

WHICH PUT A PREMIUM ON SELF-PRESERVATION. THE PRACTICAL

EFFECT OF IT IS AN ALMOST TOTAL PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION

WITH SELF AND LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR UNDERSTANDING POINTS

OF VIEW OTHER THAN ONE'S OWN. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, IT

IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE TO AN IRANIAN THAT U.S. IMMIGRATION

LAW MAY PROHIBIT ISSUING HIM A TOURIST VISA WHEN HE HAS

DETERMINED THAT HE WANTS TO LIVE IN CALIFORNIA.

SIMILARLY, THE IRANIAN CENTRAL BANK SEES NO INCONSISTENCY

IN CLAIMING FORCE MAJEURE TO AVOID PENALTIES FOR LATE

PAYMENT OF INTEREST DUE ON OUTSTANDING LOANS WHILE THE

GOVERNMENT OF WHICH IT IS A PART IS DENYING THE VAILIDITY

OF THE VERY GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE CLAIM IS MADE WHEN

CONFRONTED BY SIMILAR CLAIMS FROM FOREIGN FIRMS FORCED

TO CEASE OPERATIONS DURING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

¶4. THE REVERSE OF THIS PARTICULAR PSYCHOLOGICAL COIN,

AND HAVING THE SAME HISTORICAL ROOTS AS PERSIAN EGOISM,

IS A PERVASIVE UNEASE ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE WORLD IN

WHICH ONE LIVES. THE PERSIAN EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT

NOTHING IS PERMANENT AND IT IS COMMONLY PERCEIVED THAT

HOSTILE FORCES ABOUND. IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT EACH

INDIVIDUAL MUST BE CONSTANTLY ALERT FOR OPPORTUNITIES

TO PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST THE MALEVOLENT FORCES THAT

WOULD OTHERWISE BE HIS UNDOING. HE IS OBVIOUSLY

JUSTIFIED IN USING ALMOST ANY MEANS AVAILABLE TO EXPLOIT

SUCH OPPORTUNITIES. THIS APPROACH UNDERLIES THE SOCALLED

"BAZAAR MENTALITY" SO COMMON AMONG PERSIANS, A

MIND-SET THAT OFTEN IGNORES LONGER TERM INTERESTS IN

FAVOR OF IMMEDIATELY OBTAINABLE ADVANTAGES AND COUNTENANCES

PRACTICES THAT ARE REGARDED AS UNETHICAL BY OTHER

NORMS. AN EXAMPLE IS THE SEEMINGLY SHORTSIGHTED AND

HARASSING TACTICS EMPLOYED BY THE PGOI IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS

WITH GTE.

¶5. COUPLED WITH THESE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS IS A

GENERAL INCOMPREHENSION OF CASUALITY. ISLAM, WITH ITS

EMPHASIS ON THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD, APPEARS TO ACCOUNT

AT LEAST IN MAJOR PART FOR THIS PHENOMENON. SOMEWHAT

SURPRISINGLY, EVEN THOSE IRANIANS EDUCATED IN THE

WESTERN STYLE AND PERHAPS WITH LONG EXPERIENCE OUTSIDE

IRAN ITSELF FREQUENTLY HAVE DIFFICULTY GRASPING THE

INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF EVENTS. WITNESS A YAZDI RESISTING

THE IDEA THAT IRANIAN BEHAVIOR HAS CONSEQUENCES ON THE

PERCEPTION OF IRAN IN THE U.S. OR THAT THIS PERCEPTION

IS SOMEHOW RELATED TO AMERICAN POLICIES REGARDING

IRAN. THIS SAME QUALITY ALSO HELPS EXPLAIN PERSIAN

AVERSION TO ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ONE'S OWN

ACTIONS. THE DEUS EX MACHINA IS ALWAYS AT WORK.

¶6. THE PERSIAN PROCLIVITY FOR ASSUMING THAT TO SAY

SOMETHING IS TO DO IT FURTHER COMPLICATES MATTERS.

AGAIN, YAZDI CAN EXPRESS SURPRISE WHEN INFORMED THAT THE

IRREGULAR SECURITY FORCES ASSIGNED TO THE EMBASSY REMAIN

IN PLACE. "BUT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TOLD ME THEY

WOULD GO BY MONDAY," HE SAYS. AN MFA OFFICIAL REPORTS

THAT THE SHERRY CASE IS "90 PERCENT SOLVED," BUT WHEN

A CONSULAR OFFICER INVESTIGATES HE DISCOVERS THAT NOTHING

HAS CHANGED. THERE IS NO RECOGNITION THAT INSTRUCTIONS

MUST BE FOLLOWED UP, THAT COMMITMENTS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED

BY ACTION AND RESULTS.

¶6. FINALLY, THERE ARE THE PERSIAN CONCEPTS OF INFLUENCE

AND OBLIGATION. EVERYONE PAYS OBEISANCE TO THE FORMER

AND THE LATTER IS USUALLY HONORED IN THE BREACH.

PERSIANS ARE CONSUMED WITH DEVELOPING PARTI BAZI--THE

INFLUENCE THAT WILL HELP GET THINGS DONE--WHILE FAVORS

ARE ONLY GRUDGINGLY BESTOWED AND THEN JUST TO THE

EXTENT THAT A TANGIBLE QUID PRO QUO IS IMMEDIATELY

PRECEPTIBLE. FORGET ABOUT ASSISTANCE PROFERRED LAST

YEAR OR EVEN LAST WEEK; WHAT CAN BE OFFERED TODAY?

¶7. THERE ARE SEVERAL LESSONS FOR THOSE WHO WOULD NEGOTIATE

WITH PERSIANS IN ALL THIS:

- --FIRST, ONE SHOULD NEVER ASSUME THAT HIS SIDE OF

THE ISSUE WILL BE RECOGNIZED, LET ALONE THAT IT WILL

BE CONCEDED TO HAVE MERITS. PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION WITH

SELF PRECLUDES THIS. A NEGOTIATOR MUST FORCE RECOGNITION

OF HIS POSITION UPON HIS PERSIAN OPPOSITE NUMBER.

- --SECOND, ONE SHOULD NOT EXPECT AN IRANIAN READILY

TO PERCEIVE THE ADVANTAGES OF A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP

BASED ON TRUST. HE WILL ASSUME THAT HIS OPPOSITE

NUMBER IS ESSENTIALLY AN ADVERSARY. IN DEALING WITH

HIM HE WILL ATTEMPT TO MAXIMIZE THE BENEFITS TO HIMSELF

THAT ARE IMMEDIATELY OBTAINABLE. HE WILL BE PREPARED

TO GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL, INCLUDING

RUNNING THE RISK OF SO ALIENATING WHOEVER HE IS DEALING

WITH THAT FUTURE BUSINESS WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE, AT

LEAST TO THE LATTER.

- --THIRD, INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS OF ALL ASPECTS

OF AN ISSUE MUST BE PAINSTAKINGLY, FORECEFULLY AND

REPEATEDLY DEVELOPED. LINKAGES WILL BE NEITHER READILY

COMPREHENDED NOR ACCEPTED BY PERSIAN NEGOTIATORS.

- --FOURTH, ONE SHOULD INSIST ON PERFORMANCE AS THE

SINE QUA NON AT ESH STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. STATEMENTS

OF INTENTION COUNT FOR ALMOST NOTHING.

- --FIFTH, CULTIVATION OF GOODWILL FOR GOODWILL'S SAKE

IS A WASTE OF EFFORT. THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE AT ALL

TIMES SHOULD BE IMPRESSING UPON THE PERSIAN ACROSS THE

TABLE THE MUTUALITY OF THE PROPOSED UNDERTAKINGS, HE

MUST BE MADE TO KNOW THAT A QUID PRO QUO IS INVOLVED

ON BOTH SIDES.

- --FINALLY, ONE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE THREAT

OF BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT AND NOT

BE COWED BY THE POSSIBLITY. GIVEN THE PERSIAN

NEGOTIATOR'S CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS, HE

IS GOING TO RESIST THE VERY CONCEPT OF A RATIONAL

(FROM THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW) NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

LAINGEN

CONFIDENTIAL